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2011

# Human Security Perspectives



## Special Focus: Sustainable Peacebuilding

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## **Hybridization of Peacekeeping: Emergence of New Doctrines on Peace**

### **Abstract**

The end of the Cold War led to the increase of civil wars and resulted in a trend of asymmetric conflicts that include many non-state actors in the form of combatants and non-combatants. However, the end of the political stalemate in the Security Council also increased the ability of the United Nations to intervene in these crises. The learning outcomes from these interventions brought about a change from purely military missions to what is nowadays known as integrated and hybrid missions. The term 'hybridization' is increasingly being used to describe a trend that can be followed particularly in the last two decennia of United Nations peacekeeping. Two kinds of developments in the practice of peacekeeping can be observed. On the one hand, the tasks of peacekeepers have changed. Purely military mandates have been replaced by mandates that include also political, developmental, governance building, and humanitarian tasks. On the other hand, not only the tasks have changed, but also actors to accompany the military component of peacekeeping have increased. The aim of this paper is to trace the development of hybrid peacekeeping until today. Whether this adaptation has led to an improvement in building sustainable peace remains an open question.

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## **A Introduction**

The term ‘hybridization’ is increasingly being used to describe a trend that can be followed particularly in the last two decennia of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. Two kinds of developments in the practice of peacekeeping can be observed. On the one hand, the tasks of peacekeepers have changed. Purely military mandates have been replaced by mandates that include next to military tasks also political, developmental, governance building and humanitarian tasks. On the other hand, not only the tasks have changed but also the actors to accompany peacekeepers have increased partially fulfilling UN mandated military and non-military tasks themselves. The end of the Cold War led to the increase of civil wars, the proliferation of conflict to include more and more non-state actors, both as combatants and non-combatants, and to the increased willingness of the UN to intervene in these crises. This article will elaborate on how this changed the environment of peacekeeping and how the UN started adapting to these different political environments peacekeepers found themselves in.

## **B Towards Integrated and Hybrid Missions: Changing Environments and Approaches**

### **1 UNMIT and UNAMID: The Prime Examples**

In many ways the history of UN involvement in East Timor also depicts how the perspective of the international community on peace operations changed since the end of the cold war. The first institutionalized peace operation in East Timor in 1999, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), was a purely political mission with the mandate to organize and conduct a popular consultation in order to determine whether East Timorese people would prefer autonomy within Indonesia or separation from it. Between 1999 and 2002 a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), was established by the Security Council (SC) following the decision to separate from Indonesia. UNTAET's task was to exercise administrative authority over East Timor during the transition to

independence.<sup>1</sup> The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET), established in 2002, was also designed as a peacekeeping mission but most of its tasks were quite atypical:

- a *To provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor;*
- b *To provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service (ETPS); and*
- c *To contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of East Timor.*<sup>2</sup>

In order to perform such tasks the SC decided to depart from the typical core-military setup of peacekeeping missions and installed a structure more appropriate to fulfill the given mandate:

- a *A civilian component comprising an office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with focal points for gender and HIV/AIDS, a Civilian Support Group of up to 100 personnel filling core functions, a Serious Crimes Unit and a Human Rights Unit;*
- b *A civilian police component initially comprised of 1,250 officers;*
- c *A military component with an initial strength of up to 5,000 troops including 120 military observers;*<sup>3</sup>

From May 2005 to August 2006 the UN reduced its involvement to a political (peacebuilding) mission to support good governance activities. However, from April till June 2006 East Timor experienced again a peak in civil violence, which led the President of the National Parliament and the Prime Minister of East Timor to request another peacekeeping mission to stabilize the country. Subsequently, the Secretary General (SG) issued a report describing the situation on the ground, East Timor's humanitarian problem, and particularly emphasizing the underlying causes of the crisis.<sup>4</sup> This report emphasized the multi-dimensional character and the interconnectedness of the underlying causes:

*While the primary underlying causes of the current crisis are political and institutional, poverty and its associated deprivations, including high urban unemployment and the absence of any prospect of meaningful involvement*

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1 UNMIT Background - United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, available online at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmit/background.shtml> (all websites used in this essay were last checked on 14 April 2011).

2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1410 (2002); UN Doc. S/RES/1410 (2002), at 1.

3 Ibid., at 3.

4 Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1690 (2006); UN Doc. S/2006/628.

*and employment opportunities in the foreseeable future, especially for young people, have also contributed to the crisis.*<sup>5</sup>

This perspective indeed marked a change in how crisis were conceived by the UN. At this instance the SG argued that the international community should learn from past mistakes and should employ a mission that integrated various tasks and many non-military mandates to overcome the complexity of this crisis. The new mission in East Timor should thus have a mandate based on the needs of the people. Therefore, the SG suggested that the structure of this new kind of peacekeeping operation should integrate the following components: security sector support, police components, military components, and civilian components.<sup>6</sup> The SC followed the recommendations of the SG, and by its resolution 1704 (2006) of 25 August 2006 it established the United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT) as a new kind of peacekeeping operation. One particularly interesting element in the case of East Timor was that prior to the deployment of UNMIT the East Timorese Government had requested police and military assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal. This required that UNMIT would have to coordinate its efforts with the international security forces in a mutual endeavor.<sup>7</sup>

Another operation is key to understand how the concept of integration led to a further development towards the idea of hybridization. The African Union (AU) and UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), established in July 2007, already started with a hybrid mandate. The SC fitted it with the task and mandate to not only protect the civilian population in Darfur but to contribute 'to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).<sup>8</sup> Again the UN for different reasons, however, was in the situation to share the ground with other international actors. In this case the AU played a key role, but whereas UNMIT needed to coordinate with the structurally separate international security forces, UNAMID became a joint venture of a regional and international organization. Also worth mentioning is that the SC vested UNAMID with (the Chapter VII) authority to employ force in order to:

(i) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers,

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5 Ibid., at 34.

6 The civilian component would cover: political affairs, planning and best practices, elections, legal affairs, human rights and transitional justice, administration of justice, democratic governance, economic development, humanitarian affairs, gender, HIV/AIDS, public information and outreach, joint operations and joint mission analysis centres, and administration. See *ibid.*, at 112-137.

7 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1704 (2006); UN Doc. S/RES/1704 (2006), at 4(m) and at 5.

8 African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), available online at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid>.

(ii) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan;<sup>9</sup>

Solely from a legal and structural perspective it became already clear that the UN's concept of peacekeeping had undergone some tremendous conceptual changes. Peacekeeping missions were more and more tailored towards the necessities to build structural peace. In case where the use of force could be necessary in order to achieve this goal another bridge was built towards peacemaking mandates. Thus, it can be said that the construction of peacekeeping missions commonly referred to as "Chapter VI½" operations had been completely rethought in these instances combining all the mandates provided to the UN from Chapters VI, VII and IX UN-Charter. One might look at it as complex-mandate-missions trying to adopt all the advancements made in peace policy, such as developmental and human security approaches with bottom up elements, reacting to a newly understood reality of conflicts often termed complex emergencies. In addition to such a rethinking, the UN also needed to adapt to the changing stakeholder field in international relations where unilateral and multilateral, as well as regional efforts coincide with the global mandate of the UN to preserve international peace and security. The example of the development of the mandate of UNIFIL below will show how both, the changing challenges exerted by the environment peace-operations face but also a change of the conception of peacekeeping lead to what can be described as 'hybridization'.

## 2 UNIFIL: Adaptation to Changing Realities

In the cases of UNMIT and UNAMID we are looking at peacekeeping missions that had been created after a rather radical rethinking had taken place within the UN caused by concepts such as "human security" or the "Responsibility to Protect", both of which demanding for multi-level and multi-dimensional approaches to peace and security. It is important to notice that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was still established still during the time of the Cold War. UNIFIL experienced a qualitative change of its mandate three times since its deployment by the SC in March 1978 by the resolutions S/Res/425 (1978) and S/Res/426 (1978). These changes took place after a rethinking about peace-operations had already started. In order to give a straightforward picture of these changes I will first give a table of resolutions and corresponding mandates. Furthermore, I will link it to their historical background explicating the reasons for the change in mandates.

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9 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007); UN Doc. S /RES/1769 (2007), at 15.

<b>Resolution</b>	<b>UNIFIL Mandate</b>
<b>S/Res/425 (1978)</b>	Confirming withdrawal of Israeli forces; Restoring international peace and security; Assisting the Government of Lebanon in restoring effective authority.
<b>S/Res/426 (1978)</b>	Establishing in accordance with S/12611: To prevent the recurrence of fighting; Ensure that its area of operation is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind; Functioning as an efficient and integrated military unit; In co-operation Military Observers of UNTSO; Following the guidelines of UNEF and UNDOF being provided with weapons of defensive character to be used only in self-defense including forceful resistance against its discharging of duties.
<b>S/Res/511 (1982)</b>	Expanding the mandate in accordance with S/15194/Add.2: protection and humanitarian assistance to the population of the area
<b>S/Res/1337 (2001)</b>	Return the military personnel of UNIFIL to the operational level as referred to in S/2001/66: To about 4500 troops all ranks; UNIFIL supported mine clearing activities of the Lebanese Government (S/2001/423, para. 9).
<b>S/Res/1701 (2006)<sup>10</sup></b>	Monitor the cessation of hostilities; Accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the South, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon; Coordinate these activities with the Governments of Lebanon and Israel; Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; Assist the LAF in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of a free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area; Assist the Government of Lebanon in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in

10 Quoted from: UNIFIL Mandate - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, available online at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml>.

	<p>Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel;                  Protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and [...] to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.</p>
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**Table 1: UNIFIL Resolutions and Mandates**

Initially this mission was set up as a military peacekeeping mission without resorting to the legal force of Chapter VII UN-Charter. Therefore, the SG requested a military and an accompanying logistics unit of a total of 4,000 troops in strength.

In the Summer of 1982 Israel violated the ceasefire agreement brokered by the UN in the “Siege of Beirut”. This led to a slight change of the mandate of UNIFIL. The extension of the mandate on behalf of the SG by the SC cannot be seen as a change of strategy through the mandate – it was much more a reaction to the needs on the ground as the statement by the SG illustrates: “These [humanitarian assistance and protection] are obviously interim tasks, pending a decision by the Council on the status of UNIFIL.”<sup>11</sup> In 2000, the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon to the Blue Line and the subsequent decision of the SC to return the troops enabled UNIFIL to resume its original military functions.<sup>12</sup> The third time the mandate of UNIFIL changed happened in 2006 after the Israeli-Hezbollah war. This time the mandate was considerably expanded to include many non-military functions. Particularly ensuring humanitarian access and the safe return of displaced persons as well as safety and security for UN personnel and humanitarian workers are noteworthy in this regard.

The example of UNIFIL shows how a change in political environment (namely the engagement of a non-state actor in the conflict, that is the Hezbollah) in a time where the concept of multidimensional missions was already born led to a radical expansion of the mandate to include many non-core military objectives. Another important difference to other peacekeeping missions should be mentioned. While UNIFIL was largely dealing with an inter-state conflict (despite the involvement of non-state militants), mandates of missions, such as UNMIT, UNAMID, or MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) concerned mostly intra-state (or rather ‘asymmetric’) conflicts that required different actions. However, the increased involvement of the UN in civil wars since the end of the bipolar era made a structural change of the quality of mandates necessary.<sup>13</sup> One could say that different types of conflicts required different kinds of solutions.

11 Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon - Addendum; UN Doc. S/15194/Add.2 of 14 June 1982, at 17. Brackets added by the author.

12 UNIFIL Mandate - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

13 Donald Daniel/Patricia Taft/Sharon Wiharta, *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*, Washington DC 2008, at 13.

Even though the contextual analysis of individual missions provides some explanation of how and why UNIFIL and peacekeeping in general experienced qualitative changes, it is necessary to place this development in an even larger context that shows how the UN re-conceptualized its perspective on peacekeeping, security and peace.

### **C The Bigger Picture**

Even if these two instances are the prime examples of what can be understood as hybridization of peace operations, hybridization describes also much a bigger process. This development can be observed in the SC's growing awareness of cross-cutting issues, and it becomes clear when looking at the different topical clusters of resolutions that the SC issued.<sup>14</sup>

Also when looking at how the initial setup of peacekeeping troop contingents changed particularly after 1999 one can clearly see an increasing trend in integrating non-military components in peacekeeping operations (Figure 1).<sup>15</sup> Also when looking at mission statistics between 2005 and 2010 of peacekeeping missions such as UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia), MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti), or UNOCI (United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire), one can see that the ratio of military and non-military personnel is decreasing (see Appendix 3).

One of the key documents referred to when explaining the change of doctrines on peacekeeping is the so called Brahimi-Report, a Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations that aimed to analyze past successes and failures and that eventually led to a radical rethinking of the UN's idea about the interrelation between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.<sup>16</sup> Particularly the failures of UN peace operations in the 1990s, Srebrenica, Rwanda, Somalia, Cambodia, Angola, Somalia, and Sierra Leone, were among the reasons to rethink UN peace operations from scratch. The development of more robust and comprehensive mandates for peacekeeping operations, as already mentioned in Section B.1, covering Chapters VI, VII and IX UN-Charter (peacebuilding, peacemaking, and peacekeeping) was raised by this report as one of the key ingredients for more effective UN interventions.

Highlighting the importance of conflict prevention as endorsed in the UN Millennium Report (A/54/2000) the peacebuilding component of UN peacekeeping missions should encompass:

*a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and related rule of law elements in peace operations that emphasizes a team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights and helping communities coming out of a conflict to achieve national reconciliation; consolidation of disarmament,*

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14 See Appendix 1.

15 See Appendix 2.

16 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000); UN Doc. A/55/305 - S/2000/809.

*demobilization, and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations in their first phase; flexibility for heads of United Nations peace operations to fund “quick impact projects” that make a real difference in the lives of people in the mission area; and better integration of electoral assistance into a broader strategy for the support of governance institutions.*<sup>17</sup>

At the same time the panel concluded that the past failures of peacekeeping missions could be attributed to the inability to respond to the realities on the ground professionally and successfully in order to defend themselves and other mission components. The panel proposed the following:

*This means, in turn, that the Secretariat must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour. It means that mandates should specify an operation’s authority to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly but able to be a credible deterrent. In particular, United Nations forces for complex operations should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount an effective defence against violent challengers.*<sup>18</sup>

Another doctrinal change was the emphasis to see humanitarian and development aid through the lens of long-term conflict prevention. The resulting multi-dimensionality of peacekeeping would then require an integration of decision making and information exchange within the peacekeeping mission.<sup>19</sup> Multidimensional approaches can be described as a consequence of organizational learning and a call for more robust measures.<sup>20</sup> These two elements are not merely a consequence of experiences in the field but also related to UN-internal reconceptualizations regarding security and development. One of the key documents that introduced a multidimensional approach to peace and security was certainly the Human Development Report issued by the United Nations Development Programme in 1994. This report developed a new political doctrine, the concept of ‘human security’, which emphasized the interconnectedness of different security sectors (food, health, environmental, social, political, personal, and economic) and linked these to the individuals’ needs and conflicts.<sup>21</sup> Finally, in 2008 the so-called Capstone-Doctrine, an internal policy handbook, was released by the UNDPKO/DFS (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support). This document containing principles and guidelines for peacekeeping operations is considered the highest-level internal document binding to all

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17 Ibid., Executive Summary, at ix.

18 Ibid., Executive Summary, at x.

19 Ibid., at 198-217.

20 Lise M. Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, Cambridge 2008, at 299.

21 United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, New York, Oxford 1994, available online at [http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr\\_1994\\_en\\_contents.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_en_contents.pdf).

peacekeeping operations.<sup>22</sup> Not much new had been added to the Brahimi-Report but this key document can be seen as a milestone since for the first time the new conception of peacekeeping in its interconnectedness of sectors and its overlap with peacebuilding and peacemaking is laid down clearly in all its aspects.

Another aspect that seems to be crucial for the hybridization of tasks is increasingly human rights related peacekeeping mandates starting with the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). This inclusion of human rights into peacekeeping mandates led to a variety of obligations, among which, the obligation to provide (or at least actively support the conduct of) humanitarian aid. Maus distinguishes in this regard between three kinds of human rights bound peacekeeping mandates:

Supporting human rights mandates (“*assisting* the promotion of human rights”: MONUC, MINUSTAH, UNMIT)

Parallel human rights mandates (“*contribute* to the promotion and protection of human rights”: e.g. MINURCAT, UNOCI, UNMIL, UNMIS)

Independent human rights mandates (“*protecting* and *promoting* human rights”: UNMIK)<sup>23</sup>

These three kinds of mandates differ in the extent to which the peacekeeping mission is obliged to involve itself in the promotion and protection of human rights. One can assume that the higher the degree of human rights obligations, the higher will be the degree of hybridization of actors.

## D Conclusion

The hybridization of tasks that peacekeeping missions perform depends mostly on their mandate. It has been mentioned above that new doctrines were developed based on lessons learned from success and failures of international peacekeeping missions. These failures were to a large degree a result of employing peacekeeping strategies for interstate conflicts to the complex stakeholder field and the volatile dynamics of intrastate conflicts.

When looking into more detail at “classic” post-Cold War UN missions and follows the expansion of mandates by SC resolution one can see an obvious trend towards hybridization of tasks and actors. Clearly, the SC often acted based on the situational requirements of specific cases. However, the way it acted differs considerably from how other situations were dealt with before the birth of concepts such as “hybrid”, “integrated”, “CIMIC” etc. Overlaps with other peace operations such as peacemaking and peace enforcement on the one end of the scale and peacebuilding

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22 Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - Principles and Guidelines, Capstone Doctrine, United Nations, 2008, at 9.

23 Sylvia Maus, Human Rights in UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Framework for Humanitarian Obligations? in International Law of Humanitarian Action, Hans-Joachim Heintze/Andrej Zwitter (eds.), Heidelberg 2010, at 103.

(developmental approaches) on the other end of the scale seem to become more and more the norm.<sup>24</sup>

Whether hybridization should be seen as a general trend or rather as an addition to the strategic toolbox of UN peacekeeping remains to be seen. MONUSCO (formerly MONUC) shows that depending on the situation classical peacekeeping tasks still stand in the centre of peacekeeping. Rapid deployment capability and multi-dimensionality is one of the structural changes that feature these new mandates. Also, the UN seems to be required to cooperate more and more with other governmental actors. To conclude, however, that peacekeeping has completely changed its face would go too far. One should not forget, the core principles that defined peacekeeping from early on still keep on defining features of peacekeeping missions: consent of the parties, limitation on the use of force, neutrality and impartiality.<sup>25</sup>

To summarize what hybridization in effect means it is useful to refer separately to the internal and external dimensions of hybridization. Internal hybridization as a process can be observed in the reformulation of the tasks and mandates, thereby expanding the classical toolbox of peacekeeping to cover the following elements:

- Protection of and assistance to humanitarian action (Chapter VI UN-Charter)
- More appropriate military deployment and mandate (Chapter VII UN-Charter)
- Incorporation of observer-, coordination-, rule of law-, and election support tasks (Chapter IX UN-Charter)
- Incorporation of human rights promotion (Chapter IX UN-Charter)

External hybridization relates to a cluster of issues predominantly concerning the cooperation with other actors in the field. Coordination with UN- and independent humanitarian actors via UN-Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs becomes one of the standard procedures determining the relations with other actors. Likewise, the coordination with regional actors (AU, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, other multilateral involvement of states) is a concern that reflects a multi-polar political sphere where regional arrangements seem to increase in importance compared to the UN's peacekeeping role. In terms of the UN concept of LRRD (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development)<sup>26</sup>, a concept that became binding to all UN-bodies under the internal oversight of the General Assembly, contribution to developmental tasks of governments UN- and independent

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24 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, March 2008, 19, available online at [http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpps/Library/Capstone\\_Doctrine\\_ENG.pdf](http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf).

25 Nicholas Tsagourias, *Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional Dimension*, in *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 11 (2006) 3, at 465-482.

26 Andrej Zwitter, *United Nations' Legal Framework of Humanitarian Assistance in International Law of Humanitarian Action*, in Hans-Joachim Heintze/Andrej Zwitter (eds.), *Heidelberg 2010*, at 56.

developmental actors has also been increasingly incorporated into peacekeeping missions.

All in all both, internal and external spheres of hybridization illustrate the changed perception and approach of the UN to what it means to keep peace and to build it. It seems that, to use Galtung's terminology, the UN departed from interpreting its tasks as provided by the UN-Charter in terms of negative peace (the absence of violence). Instead, it appears that the UN now understands its own role as a creator of positive peace by taking structural and cultural violence into account. Together with a more multilateral, more privatized, and increasingly skilled stakeholder field, as well as a multi-dimensional understanding of the root causes of conflicts it seems that the cornerstones of a promising peace-operation strategy are available. It is, however, far too early to predict whether the re-conceptualization of peacekeeping based on a new understanding of peace and security will lead to better interventions and more sustainable peace. The UN is certainly addressing the failures experienced in past missions, but a re-conceptualization and restructuring of peace operations in general and peacekeeping specifically always runs the risk of running into unexpected, new problems.

**Appendix 1: Resolutions and Statements of the President of the Security Council on issues related to United Nations peacekeeping (Excerpt):<sup>27</sup>**

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: S/RES/1353 (2001); S/RES/1327 (2000) (Brahimi Report);  
Children and armed conflict: S/RES/1888 (2009); S/RES/1882 (2009); S/RES/1612 (2005); S/RES/1539 (2004) S/RES/1460 (2003); S/RES/1379 (2001); S/RES/1314 (2000); S/RES/1261 (1999);  
Cooperation with regional organizations and arrangements: S/RES/1631 (2005);  
Cooperation with troop-contributing countries: S/RES/1353 (2001);  
HIV/AIDS and peacekeeping: S/RES/1308 (2000);  
Post-conflict peacebuilding: S/RES/1947 (2010); S/RES/1646 (2005); S/RES/1645 (2005);  
Prevention of armed conflicts: S/RES/1366 (2001);  
Protection of personnel in conflict zones: S/RES/1502 (2003); S/RES/868 (1993);  
Protection of civilians in armed conflict: S/RES/1894 (2009); S/RES/1888 (2009); S/RES/1738 (2006); S/RES/1674 (2006); S/RES/1296 (2000); S/RES/1265 (1999);  
Women and peace and security: S/RES/1960 (2010); S/RES/1889 (2009); S/RES/1888 (2009); S/RES/1820 (2008); S/RES/1325 (2000);

Statements of the President of the Security Council concerning peacekeeping (also covering expanded mandates) would include the following topics:


Civilian aspects of conflict management and peacebuilding;  
Civilian police;  
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants;  
Humanitarian component in peacekeeping;  
Justice and the rule of law;  
Mine action and peacekeeping;  
Protection for humanitarian assistance in conflict situations;  
Security sector reform;  
Stand-by arrangements;

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
27 See Security Council and Peacekeeping, [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ctte/s\\_counc.htm](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ctte/s_counc.htm).



**Appendix 3: 5-Year Trends of Military/Civil Personnel Ratio in Peacekeeping Operations<sup>29</sup>**



**Figure 2: UNMIL five-year trend of military/civilian deployment**



**Figure 3: MINUSTAH five-year trend of military/civilian deployment**

<sup>29</sup> Data obtained from Peacekeeping Fact Sheet Archive. United Nations Peacekeeping, [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet\\_archive.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet_archive.shtml).




Figure 4: UNOCI five-year trend of military/civilian deployment