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2011

Human Security Perspectives



Special Focus: Sustainable Peacebuilding

This edition of *Human Security Perspectives* has been edited by

Wolfgang Benedek
Matthias C. Kettmann
Heike Montag
Markus Möstl
Pascoal Santos Pereira

on behalf of the Human Security Focus Group at the Institute of International Law and International Relations of the University of Graz, Austria, and the European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (ETC), Graz.



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*Wolfgang Benedek/Matthias C. Kettmann/Heike Montag/
Markus Möstl/Pascoal Santos Pereira*

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Matthias C. KETTEMANN*

Lessons from Libya: A Test Case for Human Security Mainstreaming?

Abstract

This contribution sets out to analyze the conflict in Libya through the prism of human security. After the 2010 commitment, by the Secretary-General, of the United Nations system to mainstream human security, Security Council action on Libya is the first important test case. Analyzing the Security Council resolutions on Libya and their implementation in light of the concept's tenets, I will argue that the international community, acting through the United Nations, have failed to learn important lessons that can be drawn from the concept of human security for peace operations because they have focused, if at all, on the concept's preventive message and its lessons from post-conflict reconstruction. They have thus left a 'conflict gap' that the concept of the Responsibility to Protect is meant to fulfill, but cannot. The contribution ends with lessons to be learned from Libya, provides a human security-based checklist for pre-intervention planning, design and administration and concludes that mainstreaming human security by the United Nations in all phases of the conflict spectrum is essential.

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* Mag. iur. Matthias C. Kettemann, LL.M. (Harvard), is research and teaching fellow and doctoral student at the Institute of International Law and International Relations of the University of Graz, Austria. Thanks go to Gerd Oberleitner for his helpful comments. The usual caveats apply. E-mail: matthias.kettemann@uni-graz.at.

A Introduction

Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey, director of the Russian journal Pravda's English language website rather drastically assessed international action on Libya: it was the place, he wrote, "where international law died".¹ Happily, international law is much more resilient than Mr. Bancroft-Hinchey may suppose. In fact, international action on Libya has resulted in a vigorous discussion on the role of human rights in Security Council decision-making and has led to some hard and good thinking on the limits of suppressing legitimate demands for political change.

What is more, for the context of this presentation, the international community's answer given in the traditional language of the UN Charter and its chapter VII can be seen as a test case for the international commitment to human security. As this analysis will show, neither the policymakers in the international community nor the decision-makers in the Security Council have taken the importance of the concept of human security for peace operations seriously. The focus on the concept's preventive approach on the one hand and its influence on post-conflict reconstruction on the other hand have left a 'conflict gap'. Security Council resolutions and the action taken by an international coalition in pursuance of the aims of the international community outlined therein provide the necessary evidence. They conflict with a number of central tenets of the concept of human security and the commitment to its mainstreaming into UN activities.

To put the issue into context, let us take a step back. The international commitment to human security cannot be denied. Having been much discussed, and both hailed and maligned, by scholars and policymakers since its introduction by the 1994 Human Development Report, the last two years have seen an important conceptual crystallization emerge in the international community. This conceptual development was coupled with the political will to implement the lessons a human security-based analysis of conflict scenarios provides.

After having decided, in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, to define and discuss the concept of human security, the international community took a first step in 2009. The United Nations General Assembly debate on human security ended with a clear call by its President for a "new culture of international relations – with the precept of human security at its core".² The tenets and elements of this new culture were then described a year later in the Secretary-General's report on human security of March 2010. After presenting human security as a practical approach in light of growing interdependence of vulnerabilities that peoples and communities are faced with, he defines the key elements of its application: human security shapes

1 Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey, Libya: Where International Law Died, 27 February 2011, http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/27-02-2011/117026-libya_law-0 (All websites used in this essay were last checked on 14 April 2011).

2 UN Press Release, General Assembly President Calls for New Culture of International Relations, With Principle Of Human Security At Its Core, During Day-long Debate, UN Doc. GA/10711 (2008), 22 May 2008, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10711.doc.htm>.

“people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and preventive responses” that “focus attention on current and emerging threats; identif[y] the root causes behind these threats; [and support] early warning systems that help mitigate the impact of such threats”.³ Human security, in the Secretary-General’s words also promotes multi-stakeholder responses targeted at protecting and empowering people and communities.⁴ I will return to these tenets of human security in section C. They will provide the foil for much of my assessment of international action regarding the conflict in Libya.

With regard to implementing human security, the Secretary-General requested the General Assembly, inter alia, to “take into account the added value of the human security concept as outlined herein and to discuss how best to mainstream human security in United Nations activities”⁵ and to provide analysis of the progress in mainstreaming human security in United Nations activities in reports submitted to the Secretary-General every other year.⁶

The discussion on how to mainstream human security in UN peace operations has not been led with the same intensity as the discussion on the value of the concept itself.⁷ This is problematic as few aspects of UN activities impact human security as intensively and directly as peace operations. One of the reasons may be that the Secretary-General himself seems to shirk away from making the concept of human security applicable to actions under chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus, early in his 2010 report on the concept he writes that “the purpose of human security is to enable all individuals to be free from fear and want, and to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential” but follows up with a clear commitment that lends itself to misinterpretation: “The use of force is not envisaged in the application of the human security concept.”⁸ In the subsequent paragraph he contrasts the application of the human security concept with the implementation of the responsibility to protect (R2P), a process in which the international community “guided by the principles of the Charter, must do its part” – including interventions – “to prevent and limit the escalation of [specific cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity]”.⁹

This has led to what I will term, in the following, the conflict gap in mainstreaming human security into UN peace operations. Throughout this article I will argue that excluding from the application, or mainstreaming, of human security all cases

3 Cf. UN Secretary-General, Human Security. Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/64/701, 8 March 2001, para. 69.

4 Cf. id.

5 Id., para. 72 (b) (emphasis added).

6 Id., para. 72 (d).

7 But see, on the many aspects of human security mainstreaming in EU and UN operations, the contributions collected in Wolfgang Benedek, Matthias C. Kettemann and Markus Möstl (eds.), *Mainstreaming Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management. Policies, Problems, Potential*. London/New York 2010.

8 UN Secretary-General, Human Security. Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/64/701, para. 23.

9 Id., para. 24.

concerning the use of force is counterproductive, as the concept can inform and influence the decision-making process on international interventions, their design and their implementation. In order to test the actual impact of the conflict gap in the mainstreaming of human security in UN activities, I will then describe key aspects of the two Security Council resolutions on Libya (section B) and undertake a human security-based critique (section C), focusing particularly on the conflict gap. Drawing lessons from Libya I will develop a human security checklist containing principles that could inform UN crisis management (section D). Highlighting that mainstreaming human security by the UN in all phases of the conflict spectrum is essential, I will conclude with a call for the Secretary-General's request to the General Assembly to discuss mainstreaming human security in United Nations activities to be understood to include the mainstreaming into UN conflict management operations (section E).

B Security Council Action on Libya

As of early April 2011 the United Nations Security Council has passed two resolutions with regard to Libya. The first, Resolution 1970 (2011),¹⁰ was entitled "Peace and security in Africa" and the second, Resolution 1973 (2011),¹¹ more to the point, "The situation in Libya". I will briefly point out key elements of these two resolutions in order to provide a basis for my subsequent human security-based analysis.

Resolution 1970 (2011) does not explicitly determine what part of Libya's action amounts to one of three Chapter VII scenarios – threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression – though the Security Council confirms that it is acting mindful of its primary responsibility to maintain peace. The references to a "gross and systematic violation of human rights" and the "plight of refugees" are in line with traditional grounds for establishing chapter VII situations, but the lack of reference to any international dimension is notable for its prejudicial impact on future scenarios. The Council demands "an immediate end to the violence and calls for steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the population" and urges the Libyan authorities, *inter alia*, to "[fact] with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and allow immediate access for international human rights monitors".¹² The referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC and the use of targeted sanctions are also notable. The use of an arms embargo against Libya, a travel ban and an asset freeze against its leadership are trusted elements in the Security

10 Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011), 26 February 2011, UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011).

11 Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), 17 March 2011, UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (2011).

12 Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011), paras. 1 and 2 (a). On the applicability of humanitarian law in Libya, see Hans-Joachim Heintze, *Anwendung des humanitären Völkerrechts in Libyen? – UN-Sicherheitsrat lässt die Frage offen*, BOFAXE No. 369D, 1 March 2011.

Council's conflict management approach, as is the establishment of a sanctions committee.

Before the Security Council's second resolution, the Human Rights Council rose to the challenge and decided, on 3 March 2011, with a reference to "gross and systematic violations of human rights"¹³ to suspend the membership rights of Libya.¹⁴

The Security Council's second resolution 1973 (2011) deplores the failure of Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 (2011), underlines the "responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population" and condemns especially the "gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions".¹⁵ The Council further warns that the "widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity" and expresses its determination "to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel".¹⁶ The Council notably refers to the regional support for its action and mentions the final communiqué of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference of 8 March 2011, the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 10 March 2011 and the decision of the Council of the League of Arab State of 12 March 2011.¹⁷

In the operative part of resolution 1973 (2011) the Security Council expressly determines that the situation in Libya "continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security" (thus implying that it was one already before, at the time of its first resolution) and, acting under Chapter VII, demands "the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians", authorizes member states – acting nationally or through regional organizations – to take "all necessary measures", thus including the use of force, to protect "civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack" in Libya.¹⁸ In paras. 6 and 8 the Council then establishes a no fly zone and again authorizes member states to take "all necessary measures to enforce compliance" with the ban on all but humanitarian flights. It further establishes guidelines for controlling the arms embargo, decides on a general ban on Libyan-owned and -registered flights and enlarges the asset freeze.¹⁹

Two days after the passing of the resolution, on 19 March 2011, air strikes against Libya were initiated.

13 Human Rights Council, Suspension of the Rights of Membership of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/RES/65/265, 3 March 2011 (without vote), preambular para. 1.

14 Id., para. 1.

15 Security Council resolution 1973 (2011), preambular paras. 4 and 5.

16 Id., preambular paras. 7 and 9.

17 Id., preambular paras. 10-12.

18 Id., paras. 1 and 4.

19 Id., paras. 17-19.

C A Human Security-Based Critique

In this section I will analyze the international action in light of the key tenets of human security as described in the Secretary-General's 2010 report²⁰ and aim to show why the conflict gap in the concept's mainstreaming is problematic. But first, let us address the conflict gap itself.

1 The Conflict Gap

A careful reading of the Secretary-General report on human security seems to show that he understands the concept to be, if not completely unrelated to the use of force, then at least too broad to be of actual use for a discussion of peace operations policies.²¹ In the report's section on violent conflicts, peacekeeping and peacebuilding the UN Secretary-General refers to the role of human security before conflicts: It can be an important "conflict prevention" tool and be implemented through conflict prevention strategies regarding the most vulnerable groups, through capacity-building initiatives and through the empowerment of local and national stakeholders.²² The report also elaborates on the role of human security after conflicts: The concept can be mainstreamed through integrated and multisectoral strategies that cover all aspects of recovery, while ensuring complementarity of all international initiatives, to further the prospect of recovery in "post-conflict settings".²³ Earlier, the concept's role in the "aftermath of conflicts" and in "post-conflict situations" is highlighted.²⁴

At no point, however, does the Secretary-General refer to the importance of human security for the period between conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction: the conflict. By thus ignoring the importance of the concept of one of three phases in the conflict spectrum (the main phase, as some would argue), the report leaves an important lacuna.

Can this conflict gap, as the report seems to suggest, be filled by the responsibility to protect? I will argue that it cannot, as suggest both theory and very recent practice: the case of Libya to be discussed below.

On a conceptual level, the most broadly accepted commitment to the responsibility to protect can be found in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. In here, the primary responsibility of each individual state to protect "its populations

20 UN Secretary-General, Human Security. Report of the Secretary-General, para. 69.

21 But see the relationship of human security to other not strictly peacekeeping related issues on the UN agenda, including the global financial and economic crisis, volatility in food prices and food insecurity, the spread of infectious diseases and other health threats, climate change and climate-related hazard events at UN Secretary-General, Human Security. Report of the Secretary-General, paras. 31 et seq.

22 Id., para. 51.

23 Id., para. 52.

24 Id., paras. 49-50.

from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity²⁵ is laid down. The international community, through the United Nations, also has a subsidiary responsibility to “help protect” populations from the above-mentioned crimes. In extreme cases, “should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities [...] manifestly fail [...] to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, collective action may be taken.²⁶

Is Libya a case of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity? Without knowing more on the situation on the ground, it is difficult to find a definite answer. The Security Council resolutions do not take up any of these terms but rather refer to a “gross and systematic violation of human rights”,²⁷ though the first resolution’s surprising referral to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) of the situation in Libya seems to suggest, in light of the jurisdiction *ratione materiae* of the Rome Statute, that one or more of the crimes that actualize the subsidiary international responsibility to protect may have been committed.

Nevertheless, the concept of the responsibility to protect in its internationally accepted form has been watered down considerably from the clear language contained in the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) of 2001.²⁸ None of the principles for military intervention²⁹ contained in the report made it into the airbrushed R2P of the Outcome Document. A number of these principles – including the “just cause threshold”, the “right intention”, the “last resort” and “reasonable prospect” – are intimately linked with principles also underlying human security. Excluding human security in peace operations thus means blocking one of the channels through which principles dear to the original conception of the responsibility to protect may flow.

2 UN Action in Light of Human Security

Some aspects of Security Council action on Libya merit closer scrutiny in light of human security. The reasons for five important international actors – Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia – to abstain from voting on resolution 1973 (2011) are a useful starting point for a human security-based critique.

Their key motives – fully in line with the tenets of human security – included protection of civilians, respect for the internal political process, the speed of the resolution, and the danger of international entry into a protracted conflict that might spread regionally. Apart from the permanent Security Council members Russia and China, the other three abstaining countries have been often-named candidates for

25 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 15 September 2005, para. 138.

26 *Id.*, para. 139.

27 Security Council resolution 1970 (2011), preambular para. 2, Security Council resolution 1973 (2011), preambular para. 5.

28 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, available online at: <http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf>.

29 *Id.*, at XII.

permanent seats in the Security Council during the UN institutional reform process and can thus be considered representative of their regions. Germany, India and Brazil also have made generally credible commitments to human rights. The arguments of the abstainers thus merit some consideration.

Brazil argued that the use of force would not end violence and protect civilians, but might exacerbate current tensions and “[cause] more harm than good to the very same civilians we are committed to protecting”.³⁰ The protection of human beings is at the centre of human security. But human security also allows for prioritization and accepts that security challenges might exist where the personal security of one group may be increased to the detriment of another’s, provided that a proportionality of means and results is guaranteed.

China would have preferred the crisis to have ended “through peaceful means” and felt that those means had not yet been exhausted. Similarly, India warned there was “a lack of certainty regarding who was going to enforce the measures”, and that “political efforts must be the priority in resolving the situation”. Human security does indeed suggest, as do the precautionary principles of the responsibility to protect, using force only as an ultima ratio, but does not preclude it, when an honest analysis makes it clear that human security can be guaranteed otherwise. It is not so difficult to argue that the international community, acting through the United Nations, pursued all practical avenues of deescalating the conflict. Three weeks passed between the two Security Council resolutions, but the Libyan government patently ignored the binding demands set out in the first. (One could argue though that the Security Council could have included an ultimatum in resolution 1970 (2011) in order to exercise more pressure on the Gaddafi regime, as it had after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.)

Germany argued that there were “great risks” and “the likelihood of large-scale loss of life”. Further, those participating in implementing the resolution could be “drawn into a protracted military conflict that could draw in the wider region”.³¹ These arguments go to the context-specificity and comprehensiveness of conflict solutions that human security demands. While it is certainly true that both chapter VII resolutions failed to contain exit strategies, it is difficult to see how the Security Council could have predicted the development of the situation in Libya. There are to my knowledge no Security Council resolutions where a clear exit strategy followed a chapter VII authorization within the same resolution. This must be left to future resolutions. But demanding the development of clear military goals and limiting the use of deployment likely to counteract limited involvement, such as the use of ground forces, is very much in line with human security.

Russia highlighted that “many questions [have] remained unanswered, including how [the resolution] would be enforced and by whom, and what the limits of engagement would be” and cautioned against unpredicted consequences and a

30 See UN Security Council, 6498th Meeting (Night), UN Doc. SC/10200 of 17 March 2011, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>.

31 Id.

further destabilization of the region.³² The integration of local and regional partners in a multi-stakeholder effort would be in keeping with human security. Sadly, the resolutions do not evidence much coordination with Libyan rebel forces or with Libyan civil society. Again though, these two elements are rarely part of Security Council deliberations and, as past resolutions suggest, sometimes difficult to achieve.³³

To the critiques voiced before the air strikes started we can add those related to the implementation of the two resolutions. Before NATO, on 23 and 24 March 2011, respectively, started to coordinate the enforcement of the arms embargo and the no fly zone,³⁴ and on 27 March 2011, decided to take over control of the whole military operation in Libya,³⁵ the roles of the North Atlantic Alliance and of the coalition seemed uncoordinated, especially with regard to air strikes on Libyan ground troops. Germany's public refusal to engage herself did little to clear the fog. Further, the concrete aim of the air strikes seemed unclear after a first phase targeted at Libya's air defenses. Strikes against thinly populated areas where only forces loyal to Gaddafi were present seem to be based on a rather loose interpretation of the protection-of-civilians clause in the resolution. The concrete military role of some of the buildings targeted in Tripoli, including on the Gadhafi compound, seemed uncertain. Coalition forces have stepped up their attacks clearly targeted at supporting rebel forces against Gaddafi forces that are not engaged in attacks against civilians, such as around Ajdabiya on 25 March 2011.³⁶ Again, this stretches the language of the resolution and contradicts some of the tenets of human security.

US President Barack Obama's approach, which was targeted at regime change, did little to assuage concerns regarding liberal interpretation of the Security Council mandate. "Now, with respect to our national interests", Obama said on 22 March 2011, "the American people and the United States have an interest, first of all, in making sure that where a brutal dictator is threatening his people and saying he will show no mercy [and] we have the capacity under international sanction to do something about that, I think it's [...] in America's national interest to do something

32 Id.

33 Even outside of the Security Council it is difficult to identify the legitimate representation of the anti-Gaddafi forces. French President Sarkozy rushed forward, when he announced on 10 March 2011 that Paris regarded the National Libyan Council (NLS) as Libya's "legitimate representative". (Cf. BBC, Libya: France Recognises Rebels as Government, 10 March 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12699183>.) It is doubtful whether at this early state of the conflict this declaration was in line with international law.

34 NATO, NATO Secretary-General's Statement on Libya No-fly zone, 24 March 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71763.htm.

35 NATO, Statement by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Libya, 27 March 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71808.htm.

36 Cf. CS Monitor, Libya Timeline: Rebels Retake Ajdabiya, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0322/Libya-timeline-Rebels-retake-Ajdabiya>.

about it”.³⁷ His 23 March 2011 address on Libya built on this approach and contained a commitment to the “universal rights of the Libyan people [including] the rights of peaceful assembly, free speech, and the ability of the Libyan people to determine their own destiny”. These human rights, Obama went on, “cannot be denied through violence or suppression”.³⁸ Driving home his argument for leadership change, Obama said on 26 March 2011 that “Moammar Gadhafi has lost the confidence of his people and the legitimacy to rule, and the aspirations of the Libyan people must be realized”.³⁹

Regime change in Libya is clearly not mandated by the Security Council. As a necessary means to the mandated end of protecting civilians from Gaddafi’s forces, however, it may be covered. A human security-approach would argue strongly for a leadership that ends the insecurities of Libyans, including their political security, their food and health insecurities and, especially of late, their personal security. Thus regime change can, in effect, lead to more human security. But legitimizing the process through human security is conceptually problematic.

This section has shown that a hard look, informed by human security, at Security Council action on Libya brings forth a number of critical issues. Interestingly, the questions that this analysis raises –

- Was the Security Council authorization in the best interest of all Libyan civilians?
- Does it pay enough attention to the internal political process?
- Was the resolution adopted too quickly?
- Is there a danger of international entry into a protracted conflict that might spread regionally?
- Should implementation procedures be defined and responsibilities be allotted to enforcing states in the resolution?
- How can a clear exit strategy be included in Security Council resolutions? –

37 White House Blog, Remarks By US President Barack Obama, El Salvador, 22 March 2011, available online at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/03/22/president-libya-we-have-already-saved-lives>.

38 President Barak Obama’s speech on Libya, 23 March 2011, available online at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/politics/24obama-statement-libya.html>.

39 Cf. Obama, Coalition Mission Succeeding in Libya, 26 March 2011, available online at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2011/03/mil-110326-afps01.htm>.

impact not only our evaluation of the resolutions but our understanding of the concept of human security and its potential as mainstreamed into the decision-making processes on UN peace operations.

D Lessons from Libya

While the use of force is, without doubt, the worst means to increase human security, all UN action, and notably action under chapter VII, can and should be influenced by the concept of human security. This systematized process of influencing chapter VII action can be termed, taking up the Secretary-General's own language, mainstreaming human security into peace operations by overcoming the conflict gap. Security Council action in Libya provides evidence for both, an international community progressively more amenable to reacting to non-international gross and systematic human rights violations, and more problematically, of a Security Council that seems unresponsive to some demands of mainstreaming human security in peace operations. At the same time proponents of human security will have to ask themselves how the concept of human security can help answer fundamental questions that every conflict raises: from the ultima ratio nature of the intervention to the exit strategy.

Arguing for mainstreaming human security into peace operations should not lead us to conclude that the Security Council action on Libya violates international law and stands in contradiction to principles of human security. Far from it: in fact, the Libyan resolutions showed the international community at its current best. That this best is not yet perfect, should not discourage internationally coordinated action under UN aegis but rather encourage critical thinking on improving mission design and planning.

The potential of mainstreaming human security to fill the conflict gap should be clearly described. I posit that a human security-oriented approach to the crisis would have sought to provide answers, before the adoption of the resolutions, to most points of critique raised earlier.

Recognizing the difficulties of international diplomacy and the realities of international conflicts, the application of human security-based considerations – of a human security checklist – could have convinced the abstaining states to join the majority. Such a human security-based list of principles – which could serve to facilitate mainstreaming the concept into Security Council action under chapter VII – can be informed by two sources: first, the principles for military intervention contained in the ICISS Report on the Responsibility to Protect, which have not been taken up in UN documents thereafter. I especially refer to the just cause threshold and the precautionary principles (right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects).⁴⁰ The second source is a document containing principles of a human

40 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility To Protect*, 2001, at XII.

security approach towards European crisis policy: the Madrid report of the Human Security Study Group.⁴¹

The authors of the Madrid Report developed six interdependent and mutually reinforcing principles: 1. the primacy of human rights (implying that the protection of civilians should be prioritized over the defeat of the enemy); 2. political authority for outside intervention which was legitimate both to local and international observers; 3. a civil-society-based bottom-up approach; 4. effective multilateralism (including a commitment to work in the framework of international law); 5. an integrated regional approach based on regional dialogue; and 6. clear and transparent strategic direction.⁴²

The six Madrid principles are slightly broader guidelines for crisis policies while the precautionary principles of the ICISS are clearly targeted at military interventions. Together they can be combined to form a human security checklist which can provide a foil for an analysis of the planning and administration of UN crisis management.

The question of whether an intervention has a just cause must mean, in terms of human security, whether the danger to the human security of human beings is so substantial as to warrant intervention. The primacy of human rights needs to be respected in all decision-making processes. Protecting civilians, as the SC resolutions on Libya demonstrate, needs to be the international community's main focus. But, as we see from the Madrid principles, protection of civilians also needs to take precedence over other motives, including regime change. This is in line with the right intention principle behind an intervention which implies that the source of the imminent threats to human security must indeed be the primary target of the intervention. Only when preventive measures have failed, root causes of conflict cannot be solved in a different way, and when all non-military means of resolving threats to human security have been tried and tested, an intervention may be possible as a last resort. A human security-based approach to intervention design makes clear that the right political authority must be sought: both the international community and the local population must consider the intervention to be legitimate.

This level of commitment to an intervention can only be reached by ensuring, first, a bottom-up approach which presupposes critically engaging civil society, including marginalized and especially vulnerable groups; by guaranteeing, second, that the intervention was developed and designed through effective multilateralism and, where possible, multi-stakeholder dialogue, based on international law; and by using,

41 Human Security Study Group (HSSG), A European Way of Security. The Madrid Report (2007), <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/Madrid>. Cf., for a fuller picture and for the evolution of the principles, the Madrid Report's precursor: A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities (2004), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/solana/040915capbar.pdf; For an assessment from the practice see Vankovska, The Human Security Doctrine for Europe: A View from Below, *International Peacekeeping* (2007), at 264. For a short review, see Kettmann, *Towards a Human Security Council? R evue de la S ecurit  Humaine* (2007), at 98.

42 Madrid Report (2007), at 9.

third, an integrated regional approach based on interstate dialogue and encompassing close cooperation with regional security organization.

The intervention must further have a clear and transparent strategic direction and employ proportional means: their scale, impact and duration should be minimized in light of the protection objective. Finally, human security within a state can never be guaranteed so long as foreign forces are present. Only in a very limited number of cases will a long term engagement be favorable to the human security situation on the ground. Therefore, interventions require reasonable prospects of success and a clear exit strategy.

E Conclusion

Commitments to some, but not all, of the human security principles described above exist in various documents and are voiced in different phases of UN crisis management. What is missing though is a clear checklist for the pre-intervention phase. The elements of a human security checklist for UN crisis management can serve as a first step in this direction. Implementing the checklist does not necessitate fundamental change in UN crisis management policies. Rather, it requires only that the Secretary-General's request to the General Assembly to discuss mainstreaming human security in United Nations activities should be understood to include the concept's mainstreaming into UN crisis management operations. This is a process, in and through which the concept of human security can develop its full potential as a strategic narrative for UN crisis management.