

Cosmopolitan Security as Alternative for Future Security Governance in Bosnia and Kosovo

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Today's world has to deal with new forms of insecurity. How should security be provided and who should be responsible for this? Scholars have very different opinions. This paper defines and discusses cosmopolitan security in relation to other forms of security namely state-centered, multilateral and market-based security. By analyzing in these terms developments in Bosnia and Kosovo during three stages of conflict; pre-war, war and post-war, this paper tries to advocate cosmopolitan security as a possible alternative for future security governance.

I. Introduction

Terrorism, 9/11, biological-, chemical- or nuclear weapons, the (unexpected) Caucasian war, genocide and international crime; these themes sketch the insecurity of today's world. Mass media brings to life this insecurity, providing people up to date information about worldwide threats, crisis and emergencies.² Security has been a more debated issue in the academic and policy field over the last years.³ The majority will agree that security is something that secures or brings safety, but how or who should provide security, scholars have different opinions about, and this will be discussed later in this writing.

This paper will define and discuss cosmopolitan security that covers fulfilment of security based on the individual needs of human beings, with the notion of humanist principles and norms, and the assumption of human equality. This fulfilment of individual human security is seen by cosmopolitanism as concern to everyone⁴. Cosmopolitan security will be advocated as possible solution for providing security over other forms of security namely state-centered, multilateral and market-based security. To advocate that cosmopolitan security might be a model for governing our future security, we will use this framework to

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² Scholte, J.A., *Globalization a Critical Introduction*, Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

³ Dorn, Nicholas, *Conceptualising Security: Cosmopolitan, State, Multilateral & Market Dynamics*, Den Hague: Boom Juridische, 2008, available online at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1185283.

⁴ Kaldor, 2003 cited in Dorn, Nicholas, *Theorising the 'International Community' and Fine-Tuning Notions of Governance Through Security*, version for EUR masters course on global governance, safety and security, 2008, Pogge, T.W., *Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty*, Ethics, No. 103, 1992, pp. 48-75.

look at two case studies; Kosovo and Bosnia by using some analytical, practical and normative examples in three stages of conflict; pre-war, war, and post-war.⁵

A. Globalization and its Effects on Governing Security

Globalization of the world has led to internationalization of risks and threats and changed the nature of the security problem moving from 'security' being the treat of inter-state war, to 'insecurity' being the permanent risk of unstableness. This development leads to resetting our understanding of the international policy framework concerning the area of conflicts and security.⁶

According to criminologists Loader and Walker after 9/11 security needs to be addressed at a global level. These post 2001 developments cross symbolic and territorial boundaries that existed before. The framework that once separated security policies at international, national and local level has become more blur and merged⁷. Distinctions that could be clearly made before are breaking down; differences between external and internal security, war and crime, the state that exercise legitimate force by using combatants and non-combatants civilians.⁸

To deal with these fundamental changes in today's world, security should be governed in a 'multi-level' way, meaning that governance is vertically spread over different geo-administrative levels and also horizontally spread over the 'multi-source' arena of transnational forums, market interests and cosmopolitan actors. Governance of security at vertical levels raises questions about how relations between these different levels should be defined according to their hierarchy and subsidiarity. Additionally, governance of security over horizontal sources leads to questions about what is and should be the role between the actors in this field. In the domain of international public law, international relations and -criminology there are active debates about these normative and analytical relations between states, multilateral organizations, market dynamics and civil society towards defining and arranging (in)security. Should relations between these actors and outcomes as results of these relations be formulated? Should a particular philosophy, certainties and institutions create the

⁵ Dorn, Nicholas, *Theorising the 'International Community' and Fine-Tuning Notions of Governance through Security*, 2008.

⁶ Chandler, D., *Review article: Theorising the Shift from Security to Insecurity- Kaldor, Duffield and Furedi*, London/New York: Routledge, 2008.

⁷ Dorn, Nicholas, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

⁸ Loader, I., and N. Walker, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*, EUI LAW Working Paper, No. 17, 2007, available online at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1022882>, Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

base for the setting of these actors – public, private, local, regional, national and international?⁹

II. State-Centred, Market-Based and Multilateral Security

Some critics think that arranging the role of these actors should be achieved through states because of their historical structure for political loyalty. Within the state there is a wide range of actors that can offer international or national security that are public as well as private. How should the relation between this public and private division be? Should individuals be able to choose their own ‘security’ in the private market? Is the state as democratic actor standing hierarchic above the private sector in providing security?¹⁰ Let’s start by looking into what pro-state advocates and theories say about these questions.

A. Pro-state Advocators and their Differences

Traditionally the state has mainly been responsible for providing security; this can be called state-centered security. Loader and Walker conceive security as being a ‘thick’ public good, and conclude therefore that the state obtained the power to provide a morally territorial form of security. Although in practice the state has not and will not always provide this. Because security has a strong social dimension, it is not something that can easily be removed from the level of the nation-state. This social dimension, for the level of feeling secure or insecure, is connected with a person’s perception of their social environment and the feeling about the safety measures in view of its sufficiency. This perception hangs together with the overall experience of that environment and the limit of manageable fear that a person can handle. The height of this limit is connected to the wider sense of trust that a person has in the social world. Considering this, it is clear that the geographic region where a person lives or has lived, will influence a person’s social dimension of safety.¹¹

Although, advocators of pro-state security provision believe in a special role for the state they diverse in how that role should be shaped. In this group a division can be made between the maximalists and the minimalists. The maximalists see the state as primary or even exclusive provider of security. If other providers are allowed (from the private sector, religious or civil society) the state should maintain a ruling role. Furthermore, for the maximalists security is perceived as a public good. The minimalists think that the state should

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Loader, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*, 2007.

either provide security only to people that cannot access non-state provision or subsidize security provided by non-state actors. The minimalist perceive security as ‘club goods’ (a term used by Crawford) where regarding the provision of safety, the state has a less important position.¹²

In the study field and practice of international relations the state-centric approach for handling security is still dominant¹³. An important school in international relations like the Realist school, has the assumption that the state is not only the major and most important actor, but is also not depending on others. Due to the constant struggle for power that drives states, they are caught in a situation that is called the security dilemma. Pursuing a policy based on balancing power is the only way to avoid war.¹⁴ Furthermore according to pro-state advocates, states are the only actor that can provide legitimacy in its actions. So, if international security cooperation occurs within multilateral organizations, legitimacy is delegated through the states with the main purpose that states benefit from this cooperation¹⁵. What Realism cannot explain is the increase of maintained models of cooperation (including security cooperation) within and through international organizations, such as EU, UN and NATO; this makes the realist theory a weak tool for analysis.¹⁶

B. Unilateralism in the Field of International Security

Before we take the step to the debaters of non-state security, we first have a look to another state-centered approach namely unilateralism, that is not plural but singular. After the Cold War, the external danger of the Soviet Union was removed and the United States became the most important military actor. Since then, there are many positions that claim that the United States have the capacity and legitimacy to act like the ‘world’s policeman’.¹⁷ Robert Kagan describes vividly in his article Power and Weakness the different perceptions that Europeans and Americans have regarding the ways of dealing with (in)security. Americans in International affairs intent to achieve finalities; problems are supposed to be solved and threats should be eliminated. Americans are less willing to operate through multilateral organizations and if necessary don’t hesitate to act alone outside agreed restrictions. The source of this problem is a power problem between Europe and America. America showed

¹² Dorn, *Conceptualising security*, 2008.

¹³ Loader, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*, 2007.

¹⁴ Rittberger, V. and B. Zangl, *International Organizations: Polity, Politics and Policies*, Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

¹⁵ Loader, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*, 2007.

¹⁶ Rittberger, *International Organizations: Polity, Politics and Policies*, 2006.

¹⁷ Loader, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*, 2007.

military to be strong and shows tendency in using this strength. In contrast, Europe showed being military weak for a long time and therefore created a world where strength doesn't matter; where multilateral institutions and international law dominates and unilateral state-action is not allowed¹⁸. After 9/11 it appears that the unilateralism behavior of America towards international security areas is increasing from anti-terrorist co-operation towards internationally standardizing security for example regarding Customs, Immigration and Naturalization. Unilateralism seen in this hybrid world shows little potential to create a global public interest and resistance towards this intolerant form of power kept by one state will lead at one moment to opposition from others through soft forms of power like economic, regulatory and cultural forms. Apart from this, the military power used by America in Iraq proved itself not to be a good solution and is lacking (national and international) legitimacy.¹⁹

C. Alternatives Coming from Non-State Advocators

Advocators for non-state security see a decline of state power and therefore say that the states' ability to control over national and international security is in question. Scholars in the field of global governance share the perception that power is increasingly arranged over a wide range of actors, of which the state is just one.²⁰ Behind these critics are scholars that are advocating non-state security for different reasons. Firstly, there are scholars that see security provided by the private or market sector as normatively preferable. They think that every group has its own concept of security and should be able to define their own security needs, rather than the state doing this for them in an inappropriate or even an oppressive way.²¹ For this reason they point out that resulting from practice, private security is more dominant (a point that the pro-state camp hardly denies). Security can in this way be seen as a series of 'nodes' because it is unlikely that one single provider can serve all customers what they want. This view is supported from the side of less developed or developing countries, where tribal, traditional or religious actors can be one of the possible security providers. Less developed or developing countries don't have a strong public sector to arrange security through the public sector. Security is provided and disputes are settled on the basis of 'tradition'. Baker²² makes the point that this 'choice in security' can lead to an unfair position for the ones that aren't in the position to choose, as a result of their social or economical position within society, for

¹⁸ Kagan, R., *Power and Weakness*, Policy Review, No. 113, 2002, pp. 1-22, available online at: <http://www.unc.edu/home/rlstev/Text/Kagan%20Power%20and%20Weakness.pdf>

¹⁹ Loader, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*, 2007.

²⁰ Wilkinson, R., *The Global Governance Reader*, London/New York: Routledge, 2005.

²¹ Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

²² Baker, 2008 cited in Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

example like the poor, woman, minorities and so on.²³ Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini also highlight in their work that security risk is becoming more unequally distributed as a result of privatizing security; the ones that can pay for security can enjoy it and the others not.²⁴

D. Public – Private Dependence

The emergence and growth of the private security sector in the form of private military companies (PMC's) and private security companies (PSC's) underlines that the state is losing its monopoly over means of force. PMC's (known before as mercenaries) are private companies specialized in military skills. While most PMC's serve governments and armed forces, some of them have worked for UN or NGO's. Others found their prosperity in other markets and are working for dictators, organized crime or terrorist groups. PSC's are companies trained in providing protection for people and property including humanitarian and industrial belongings. Civilian contractors working for PSC's helped states in fighting recent wars in Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq²⁵. This illustrates how depending the public sector is from the private sector in this security field, Schreier and Caparini even affirm that state militaries from the US, UK, Australia and Canada would struggle to wage war without help from these private companies. It seems that this market-based form of security is clearly here to stay and created new opportunities and challenges in the domain of international relations. State armed forces providing security should consider how to find a way of working and dealing with these PSC's and PMC's just like they had to do in the past with NGO's. In particular there should be defined a (international) framework of rules considering indistinct matters like accountability, reliability and legitimacy.²⁶

This brings us to the last concept that is discussed in this paragraph; security provided by multilateral organizations. This kind of security has been claimed by state minimalists and in that perspective; multilateralism can be used to enhance multiple non-state providers of security.²⁷

²³ Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

²⁴ Schreier F. and M. Caparini, *Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Occasional Paper No. 6, 2005.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

E. Multilateral Solutions

In international relations the term ‘multilateralism’ means the practice and principle of three or more states cooperating together by and through multilateral forums and institutions.²⁸ These forums/institutions function through established rules and address common problems and opportunities²⁹. Multilateral organizations became more important in the 19th and 20th century. From a criminological perspective, multilateral is considered to be a public-private mix, because within multilateralism states are not exclusively involved.³⁰

International public-private multilateralism is present in a strong and weak sense. There are multilateral organizations that address safety and formally as a mix of state and non-state actors. However uninfluenced by the formal arrangement of multilateral organizations, they are observed, held accountable, assisted and obstructed by a wide range of non-state actors³¹.

In the past security related acting, through multilateralism has addressed and solved issues like in Namibia and El Salvador but they also failed and showed not to be efficient in cases like Rwanda and Bosnia.³² Furthermore some institutions like UN, is more dominated by the unilateral power of one state; America. What this means for multilateral and state-centered security advocates is unclear.³³ Multilateral security might be endangered by this unilateral dominance because the pre-eminent state (like US) could misuse multilateral institutions (like UN) singly to pursue its own interest. In addition when the interest of the pre-eminent state is not served by multilateralism it will not be hard to ignore the multilateral institution and act unilateral, or even worse, the dominante state would be able to bring an end to the multilateral institution.

III. Cosmopolitanism

A. Moving Beyond the State-Centered View

As described before, in order to understand present-day security issues, it is useful to see beyond the state-centered analysis (most commonly used in criminology). Governance seen from a state-centered view, is the extension of the government beyond states by mobilizing other social organizations and processes, but still mainly arranged by states. From this

²⁸ Newman, E., *A Crisis of Global Institutions, Multilateralism and International Security*, London/New York: Routledge, 2007, Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006 cited in Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

²⁹ Newman, *A Crisis of Global Institutions*, 2007.

³⁰ Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Griffin, M., *Where Angels Fear to Tread: Trends in International Intervention*, Sage Publications, Vo. 31(4), pp. 421-435, 2000, available online at: <http://sdi.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/4/421>

³³ Newman, *A Crisis of Global Institutions*, 2007

perspective, privatization of certain aspects in public security leads to spreading the load, expenditure, efforts and responsibility for outcomes.

Despite this illustration, private security is clearly more than just a state stimuli response. Private security covers specific interest of both its providers and customers, including the state, but also other economical and social groups that might have complete different interests. This wide range of interests cannot be captured by the concept of state responsibility.

The situation becomes even more complex because of the expansion of multilateral organizations within which states and private providers participate in the cooperation and conflict process and the fact that these multilateral institutions can also build up their own demands and bonds. Concluding, the analysis must be less state-centric and more international while keeping the diversity of interests in mind. The question that rises is: should there be an overall general interest that goes through but also above the different state, corporate and multilateral interests, to bind them in a certain way?³⁴

B. Responsibilities within Global Governance

Within criminology, Nico Kirsch mentioned that the difficulty of answering the question to whom global governance should be held responsible, hangs together with the competition between national, international and cosmopolitan constituencies shaping the field.

By seeing this diversity of state organizations, market interests, multilateral organizations and cosmopolitan actors, multi-source security is a fact.

‘National security’ showed its limitations and no longer gives citizens a feeling of security. Multilateral organizations and forums proved not to be inspirational, because they moved into a less fulfilling cooperation between ‘the willing coalitions’. Security solutions delivered by the market providers do not adequately fill the gap from state-centralized and multilateral security, particularly not for the poorer within a community.

This paper supports the cosmopolitan view, that normatively a shift is necessary from state-centric national security to a global overreaching security for everybody.³⁵

C. Cosmopolitan Security?

As an alternative to state-centered, multilateral and market-based forms of security, cosmopolitanism might be an option. Cosmopolitanism emerged first in philosophy and was

³⁴ Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

³⁵ Ibid.

then adopted in other fields like social theory, law and criminology³⁶. Favored and advocated (in different ways) by many like social theorists such as Zygmund Bauman, Mary Kaldor, Ulrich Beck and political philosopher Jürgen Habermas, cosmopolitanism found its roots more than 200 years ago. Its fundamental principle comes from the essay *To Perpetual Peace* written by Immanuel Kant in 1795. In his essay, Kant advocates a ‘cosmopolitan right of hospitality’ which he describes as “...*the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy...*” and where there should be the option for that outsider to become a fellow citizen for a certain period.³⁷ Kant says about the stranger that it is not a guest, yet we have the duty of hospitality towards him. Bauman refers to this hospitality not as invitation but of visitation, reflecting Simmel’s point that the stranger’s arrival is uninvited.³⁸

It is important to mention that cosmopolitan’s have different views of how cosmopolitanism should be preached and practiced. Despite different views, cosmopolitanism as ideology, outlook or moral, challenges us to reconsider what it means to live together in one world and to be part of humankind.³⁹ Thomas Pogge describes in his article three elements that are shared by all cosmopolitan positions:

1. Individualism; the human beings, or persons are more important than family lines, ethnic groups, clan’s, cultural or religious communities, nations, or states.
2. Universality; human beings are seen as equal – there is no difference between man, woman, whites, aristocrats, Muslims, or Jews etc.
3. Generality; this individual position has global force – humans are of concern to everyone; not only to their family, fellow religionists or such like⁴⁰.

Cosmopolitanism seeks flexibility in citizenship where people are permitted to shift their identities creating a plurality of possible relationships, that don’t strike each other.⁴¹ Cosmopolitanism has a universal view towards rights, being equal for all humans on the basis that they are living on Earth, in contrast to a state-view that sees rights as privileges that are connected with inhabiting a certain nation state⁴². Carson comment on the cosmopolitan perspective says that it can be an alternative bringing communities and humans together,

³⁶ Hudson, *Difference, Diversity and Criminology* 2008, pp. 275-292.

³⁷ Kant, E., *To Perceptual Peace*, 1975, at p6, Hudson, *Difference, Diversity and Criminology*, 2008, at p. 282.

³⁸ Bauman in Hudson, *Difference, Diversity and Criminology*; 2008, at p. 282.

³⁹ Cheah, P. and B. Robbins, *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

⁴⁰ Pogge, *Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty*, 1992, pp. 48-75.

⁴¹ Berman, P.S., *Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era*, University of Connecticut School of Law Articles and Working Papers, No. 24, 2005, pp. 1819-1882.

⁴² Hudson, *Difference, Diversity and Criminology*, 2008, pp. 275-292.

rather than dividing them⁴³. The cosmopolitan utopia means the end of human right violation worldwide⁴⁴.

From the security point of view, cosmopolitanism is about the security of individuals and “*it combines human rights with human development*”.⁴⁵ The individual needs of humans should guide international interventions to secure the ones at risk, whether this risk is cost by armed conflicts or natural disasters.⁴⁶ Cosmopolitan security will cover the security needs of the individual⁴⁷ and seeks to understand the problems of multiple community memberships.⁴⁸ Habermans describes in his work *The divided West* that cosmopolitanism will eradicate power politics (and therefore can be a solution for the US hegemony) and should lead to the constitutionalizing of international relations. According to him the process of European unification is an example that should be followed. Opponents of Habermans vision claim that the assumptions that he makes to support his arguments are not proved. His first assumption that dialogue will lead in the end to consensus (problem: why didn't it happened yet?). His second assumption: agreement can be reached through mutual position taking (problem; why should states or groups give up their own vision and agree with others?).⁴⁹

So overall cosmopolitanism has an attractive vision; it emphasizes the needs of common humanity, has a focus on global public goods and mainly does so in an optimistic intellectual way, while reshaping the political framework.⁵⁰ On the other hand, cosmopolitanism also receives criticism and there are issues which cosmopolitanism has to deal with.

One point of critics is that cosmopolitanism has a lack of orientation, it is not clear what is included or excluded and that weakens its standpoint.⁵¹ Furthermore Loader and Walker state in their paper that cosmopolitanism doesn't recognize values that are irreducible from the local community and therefore fails to see security as being a ‘thick’ public good.

In addition, there are three major issues that cosmopolitanism has to deal with in order to fill the security gap and to create a more positive and inclusive agenda. These are:

⁴³ Carson, 2007 in Hudson, *Difference, Diversity and Criminology* 2008, pp. 275-292.

⁴⁴ Hudson, *Difference, Diversity and Criminology* 2008, pp. 275-292.

⁴⁵ Kaldor, 2007, at p. 182 in Chandler, D., 2008, *Review article: Theorising the Shift from Security to Insecurity-Kaldor, Duffield and Furedi*, London/New York: Routledge, at p.276.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Loader, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*, 2007.

⁴⁸ Berman, P.S., 2005, *Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era*, University of Connecticut School of Law Articles and Working Papers, No. 24, pp. 1819-1882.

⁴⁹ Tambakaki, P., *Towards a Cosmopolitan Legal Order?*, International Studies Review, No. 10, 2008, pp. 103-105.

⁵⁰ Loader, *Locating the Public Interest in Transnational Policing*, 2007.

⁵¹ Beck, U., *The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies*, Theory, Culture & Society, Vol.19 (1-2), 2002, pp. 17-44.

1. Security agenda-setting; the information and analysis that are used to set the agenda in the security field mainly come from the private sector (the public sector uses this information, but doesn't control it). Moreover the formation of the security agenda occurs between private intelligence firms and state agencies. This established pattern makes it very difficult for cosmopolitan aspirations.

2. No fixed outcomes; until now cosmopolitan initiatives have had mixed outcomes. In the field of environmental security, industrial safety and by establishing the international criminal court; cosmopolitanism showed itself to be a success. In contrast to this, there are also some unintended failures like the attempt at Srebrenica and the fight against corruption. These examples will be elaborated later in this writing.

3. Eurocentric reputation; the cosmopolitan agenda is known for its western orientation and if it want to become more international, then it should compromise with more non-western traditions⁵²

IV. Case study Bosnia

A. Short History

In 1992 Bosnia, one of the six former Yugoslavian republics, declared independence following Croatia and Slovenia that had earlier declared independence and were by then, internationally recognized. Bosnia's ethnic Serbs feared a minority status in the new Bosnian state and thus rejected independence of Bosnia. As the European Community recognized Bosnia as an independent state, one of the most brutal wars began between Bosnian Serbs on one side, and Bosnian Croats and Muslims on the other side. The war started on April 6th 1992 and ended on October 12th 1995⁵³

B. Pre-war Sanctions

Since the conflict in Bosnia is an intra-nation conflict, analytically seen, a state-centered form of security (in both pre-war and war stages of conflict) is not an option. In addition, the inhabitants cannot reach consensus about any form of state-centered form of security because the social dimension of security which inhabitants have, is directly opposing it. For the same reason, normatively seen a market-based form of security is not wishful; the security needs of

⁵² Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

⁵³ Andreas, Peter, *The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia*, International Studies Quarterly, No. 48, 2004, pp. 29-51.

one person will undermine the safety of the other. Let alone the unequal distribution of security as result of a market-based solution.

Before the conflict started, international sanctions (to prevent an armed conflict) were placed on the former Yugoslavia region. An international arms embargo was set by UN (as multilateral attempt to provide security) in September 1991. This embargo meant to restrain war, but in practice it led to a military advantage for the Bosnian Serbs who were able to smuggle arms and supplies because of their good geographic position.⁵⁴ The embargo clearly failed to achieve its goal and even made (unintended) the opposite possible; ethnic cleansing and genocide⁵⁵. Practically seen, the multilateral sanctions didn't work.

C. War Intervention by UN

Strategically seen, the UN intervention in former Yugoslavia was a disaster. There was no cohesive plan or clear goal⁵⁶. An example of this (mainly multilateral) failure is the massacre in Srebrenica that couldn't be prevented by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) due to the lack of good management by UN. Troops for UNPROFOR were provided by different countries, among them the Netherlands driven by cosmopolitan ideals. Unfortunately, for the civilians and their protective troops, this intervention was not adequately planned and controlled.⁵⁷ It was unclear what the objectives and rules of engagement were, and the mandate that was given to the UN forces are described by many to be unrealistic and inappropriate.⁵⁸ As result, the Serbs took control of Srebrenica in July 1995 and eight thousand people lost their lives. Here the normative intention of cosmopolitanism shows itself not to be 'good enough', since in practice unintended consequences can play a part.⁵⁹

D. Post-war Developments

Since analytically and practically seen a state-centered form of security was not realizable, after the war, it was decided to divide Bosnia (according to Dayton Peace Accords) into a Bosnian-Croatian/Muslim entity and a Bosnian-Serbian entity. In order to monitor the reached agreements, the function of a High Representative also to represent the international

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Williams, P.R., 1995, *Why the Bosnian Arms Embargo is Illegal*, Wall Street Journal-Europe, available online at: <http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/publications/editorials/Bosnian%20Arms%20Embargo.htm>.

⁵⁶ Stedman, S.J., *The New Interventionists*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, 1993, pp. 1-16.

⁵⁷ Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

⁵⁸ Higgins, 1993 and Caplan, in Fixdal, M. and D. Smith, 1998, *Humanitarian Intervention and Just War*, Mershon International Studies Review, No. 42, 1996, pp. 283-312.

⁵⁹ Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

community through UN was created. The above function is at the same time also EU's Special Representative.⁶⁰

To prosecute and convict people that were suspected of committing war crimes, The International Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia was installed. This was mainly the result of cosmopolitan effort, rather than pressure from the state or the market. Many claim that the NGO's deserve the credit to convince the Security Council of the importance of this tribunal.⁶¹ This establishment can be called a practical example of cosmopolitan success.

Another normatively and practically good example of cosmopolitanism success in post-war Bosnia comes from the feminist side. Represented by woman's NGO's, women were widely engaged in a variety of campaigns to promote woman human rights and gender equality⁶²

In post-war Bosnia, a lot of corruption (in private and public field) was present. Cosmopolitans put the fight towards this corruption (especially in the public area) high on the agenda. So high that (as stated by Chandler) in its fight to deal with corruption, cosmopolitanism undermined the development of democracy and trust in public institutions⁶³⁶⁴. Normatively seen the intentions might have been good (to cut corruption), but practically seen the results of this cosmopolitan action, are not as desired.

V. Case Study Kosovo

A. Short History and Pre-war Situation

Kosovo is a small region that is inhabited by ninety percent Albanian and ten percent Serbians. It has been a region of conflict for over more than 600 years. After the defeat of the Ottoman-Turks in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) it was ceded to Serbia. In 1974 Kosovo was granted autonomy by the Yugoslavian constitution. This development by reinforcing the ethnic Albanians desire for independence and the growing Serb nationalism contributed directly to the rising tensions in that area. When in 1989 Yugoslavia broke apart, Serbia declared itself the federal successor and removed the status that Kosovo gained in 1974. This was followed by Milosevic's repressive policies such as dismissing the local government,

⁶⁰ Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative (OHR), available online at: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=38519.

⁶¹ Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

⁶² Helms, E., *Woman as Agents of Ethnic Reconciliation? Woman's NGOs and International Intervention in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina*, *Woman Studies International Forum*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2003, pp. 15-33.

⁶³ Dorn, *Conceptualising Security*, 2008.

⁶⁴ Chandler, D., *Building Trust in Public Institutions? Good Governance and Anti-corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2006, pp. 85-99.

closing Albanian schools and not tolerating any opposition to this. As reaction, ethnic Albanians formed the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) to fight for their independence⁶⁵. Due to the continuing Serbian military attacks against the KLA, by 1999 (according to NATO) 1.5 million Kosovars had been displaced from their homes, 225.000 Kosovar men were missing and 5,000 Kosovars had been killed.⁶⁶

B. War Declared by NATO

Although three UN security resolutions about Kosovo were passed in 1998, none of them included the authorization to use force. Yet on March 24, 1999 NATO began (in reaction on the humanitarian disasters and while being afraid for destabilization of the region) a 78-day military intervention in Kosovo without a UN passing resolution authorizing this. This decision of NATO can be seen as a break to usual practice of international interventions (from the law point of view) and therefore some critics even doubt the legitimacy of this (multilateral) action.⁶⁷ Legitimate or doubtful, statistical research even proved that earlier Western attempts to change Milosevic's mind regarding Kosovo (from 1998 towards the beginning of 1999) were unsuccessful. Here again a multilateral form of security (maybe with strong cosmopolitan ideals) showed not to be suitable enough in the field of international security.⁶⁸

C. Post-war Results

After Milosevic surrendered in June 1999 and the war was over, Kosovo came under the UN mandate and since then Serbs and Albanians live separated. Although the war ended the conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanian was not over, protests and violence took place since then (like in March 2004). It was decided that status quo was not longer acceptable and in 2006 talks about the future status of Kosovo started again⁶⁹.

At this moment 51 UN member states recognize Kosovo as being an independent state without the permission of Serbia.⁷⁰ Seen from the international law, Helen Quane concludes that Kosovo Albanians did not appear to have the right for self-determination. Deduced from this, Russia used Kosovo's independence to justify their intervention in Georgia resulting in

⁶⁵ Papakostandini, M., *Humanitarian Intervention and Kosovo*, Rotterdam, Erasmus University, 2002.

⁶⁶ Garamone 2002 in Papakostandini, M., *Humanitarian Intervention and Kosovo*, 2002.

⁶⁷ Schroeder, E., *The Kosovo Crisis: Humanitarian Imperative versus International Law*, World Affairs, Vol. 28:1, 2004, pp. 179-197.

⁶⁸ Pevehouse, J.C. and J.S. Goldstein, *Serbian Compliance or Defiance in Kosovo? Statistical analysis and real-time predictions*, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 4, 1999, pp. 538-546.

⁶⁹ Judah, T., *Divorcing Serbia: The Western Balkans in 2006*, World Affairs, Vol. 30:2, 2006, pp. 213-220.

⁷⁰ *Who Recognized Kosova?*, available online at: <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/>.

the Caucasian-war.⁷¹ Recently the UN agreed with Serbia to ask the International Court for advice concerning the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo.⁷² This development, seen as a multilateral success, shows that the last word around Kosovo's status has not been said.

VI. Conclusion

In conclusion, could cosmopolitan security be an alternative for future security governance in Bosnia and Kosovo? The answer from a normative perspective will be 'yes' (as fast as possible please) but analytically and practically seen there are doubts and there is no clear answer. In the globalized world, state-centered, multilateral and marked forms of security showed their limitations. But what are the alternatives? Cosmopolitan security showed itself to be applicable in some ways, but has to deal with some issues first and should improve itself in order to fill the present security gap. For both Bosnia and Kosovo, it is clear that in the past, security attempts (mainly multilateral as well as cosmopolitan) often didn't fulfill their intended goal. In the future, more international effort should be made to prevent these humanitarian disasters. In this respect, cosmopolitanism (if more supported by the international law) can provide security solutions. A hybrid solution of cosmopolitan security offered through multi-lateral organizations and supported by states and the market might be an option. Yet more research should follow on how to shape this framework in practice, so that it will obtain (the needed) support by all levels and actors that are of importance in the international security field.

⁷¹ Clover, C., 2008, *The message from Moscow: Resurgent Russia bids to establish a new status quo*, Financial Times, available online at:

[http://folders.sin-online.nl/9651/51917/\(4b\)%20Message%20from%20Moscow%20\(states\),%20FT.pdf](http://folders.sin-online.nl/9651/51917/(4b)%20Message%20from%20Moscow%20(states),%20FT.pdf)

⁷² Bancroft, I., *Serbia's triumph over EU double standards*, Guardian, 2008, available online at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/oct/10/eu.serbia>.